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Symposium:
Judicial Professionalism in a
New Era of Judicial Selection
October 22, 2004
Session Three: Improving the
Election of Judges, Part II
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Welcome to the afternoon session of the
Symposium. I am Seth Kirschenbaum. I am an attorney in Atlanta,
and I want to introduce my distinguished panel.
Furthest away from me is Bill Weisenberg. Bill is the Assistant
Executive Director of the Ohio State Bar Association and serves as the
liaison between the Bar and the Legislature and the Governor's office in
Ohio. Bill served as Chief Counsel of the Ohio House of Representatives
Judiciary Committee, and he received the Ohio Legal Assistance
Foundation Presidential Award in 1997 for his efforts in recruiting
access to justice for Ohio's poor.
In the middle is my namesake, Seth Andersen. Seth is the Project
Manager of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Judicial Independence. That committee assists state and local bar
associations in the implementation of ABA policies on state judicial
selection and response to criticism of judges, and works collaboratively
with other national, state, and local organizations to enhance the
independence of the judiciary. Seth is really the man who knows
everything that is going on everywhere in every state in the country on
matters relating to judicial selection and retention.

859

860

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Closest to me and to your right is Mike Sweeney. Mike is a former
professor, now an adjunct professor, at Fordham Law School. He is legal
counsel to the New York State Commission to promote public confidence
in judicial elections. He was also a Founding Fellow of the Joseph R.
Crowley Center for International Human Rights at Fordham Law School.
We are going to try to cover a few things in our panel discussion this
afternoon, and we are hoping that the discussion is pretty lively. One
of the first things we are going to do is stick with the White case a little
bit more because we think there are a few other things to talk about
relating to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.1 I want to start
with Seth Andersen and ask you, Seth, what are the states doing in
response to White and the media?
MR. ANDERSEN: Thank you, Seth, and thanks to Mercer Law
School, especially Pat Longan, for hosting this event and to all of you for
coming to listen and participate in this discussion.
Before I mention what is going on in the states, I would just mention
briefly that the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct was revised as a
result of the Republican Party of Minnesota v. White decision in 2003.
The ABA put together a special working group to look specifically at
Canon 5 on political activity, and some changes were made even though
the existing ABA Code did not contain the announce clause that was
struck down in the Minnesota case. There was a recognition that there
was some language still in the Code that was a little too broad and it
needed to be tightened up a bit.
The ABA also added a definition of judicial impartiality largely at the
prompting of Justice Scalia's majority opinion in White that would clarify
a little bit better what we are talking about. We are talking about
impartiality of individual judges.
On top of that revision, the ABA is currently undertaking a complete
revision of its Model Code of Judicial Conduct. A joint commission of
judges and attorneys, and one non-lawyer member, have been working
for over a year now and will continue to work for close to another year.
It is a fairly large job to revise this Code. It has been made an even
larger job with the recognition that the prior organization and presentation of the Code was not necessarily always the easiest thing for judicial
disciplinary counsel in the states to understand, adopt, and implement.
There is a movement to make the Model Code of Judicial Conduct more
rules-based and have it better reflect the approach taken in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers.

1.

536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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The ABA Code is in flux. There will be a new Canon 5 released for
public comment, and I would encourage anyone who is interested in
The new Canon 5
reviewing that to check on the ABA's web site.2
should be out within the next couple of months. We anticipate that the
final Code will be presented for approval by the ABA House of Delegates
next August in Chicago at the annual meeting.
All of the states, certainly all of the states that have judicial elections
and had to respond to White because they had the announce clause, felt
that they were required to take it off the books pretty quickly. Some
states have actually left it in their Codes. They just have not gotten
around to formally repealing their announce clauses.
There has been a wide range of responses in the states to the White
decision, such as Missouri, which did have the announce clause and took
it out very promptly. However, the supreme court issued an order
stating that the pledges and promises clause and the commit clause were
still in full force and effect, and in fact they had teeth, and if you
violated them, you were going to feel the consequences. Nevada just
recently adopted some changes to its Code to tighten up its language,
but once again the commit clause and the pledges and promises clause
remain.
Minnesota is a larger, more complicated story because they, as
Barbara Reed mentioned this morning, are undergoing a rehearing.
Minnesota just had the oral argument two days ago on a couple of issues
that were still standing in the White case in the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. But separately, the Minnesota Supreme Court last year
established a special task force to examine its Code of Judicial Conduct
in light of the decision in White and other developments. That special
task force came back with a set of recommendations, all of which were
adopted except for one. The recommendation not adopted was that
Minnesota should give up trying to have non-partisan judicial elections
by eliminating the political activity provisions that prohibit judicial
candidates or judges from running as a member of a party, attending
party functions, and doing the kinds of things that you find judges have
to do in partisan election states. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
that recommendation, pending the outcome of the existing issues in the
White case from the federal court of appeals. Minnesota has maintained
its political activity provisions essentially as they were before the
decision in White under the argument that the compelling state interest
in maintaining an independent judiciary free from the direct influences

2. See http://www.abanet.org.

862

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

of partisan politics justifies a sufficiently narrowly tailored political
activity provision to keep judges out of partisan politics.
At the other end of the spectrum, North Carolina adopted a number
of changes to its Code, I believe in 2003, which I think could charitably
be said were a very broad reading of the decision in White. The former
prohibition on personal solicitation of funds, the one that is very similar
to the one that used to exist in Georgia, was removed from North
Carolina's Code. Paradoxically, a number of the political activity
prohibitions or portions of its Code were also removed even though the
North Carolina Supreme Court and court of appeals are now officially by
statute elected in non-partisan judicial elections. That was part of the
public financing law that was adopted and signed a couple of years ago.
North Carolina has a Code that says you can be political, but you also
have a law that says you are going to be in non-partisan elections.
North Carolina has made great strides, and the implementation of
public financing there is really an amazing thing. North Carolina is
serving as a model for many states around the country that are
interested in these reforms, but there are also many internal tensions in
North Carolina right now.
Many other states are waiting to see how a number of federal court
decisions may play out. Many states are also waiting to see how the
new and revised ABA Model Code resolves many of these questions
before they do complete revisions of their Codes.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Bill, how has Ohio responded to White?
MR. WEISENBERG: In Ohio the announce clause had been repealed
by the Ohio Supreme Court several years ago, so the decision in White
in Ohio for all intents and purposes really has not meant a great deal.
The problem, and I say this very candidly, is not the candidates. The
candidates do not have to speak because there are the independent
campaign committees that came about several years ago that are doing
the talking. They are the ones doing the advertising. They are the
messengers. Now, the question is, are the candidates involved with the
committee? Probably not directly, but they know what is happening.
The independent campaign committees are the ones who run ads.
Perhaps some of you have seen them in other forums where they
telegraph the message about how a certain candidate understands the
importance of an issue, or understands the importance of doctors that
may be leaving the state, or understands that frivolous lawsuits are
driving up the costs of business in Ohio, or that a certain candidate is
better for our side rather than their side. These are the ads they ran in
2002.
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So the White case really is not a serious problem. The question that
remains, in my opinion, is whether the candidates are about to commit
themselves or make a pledge or promise with regard to a particular issue
that may be pending before the court or about to come before the court.
As we know, judges and judicial candidates are not supposed to do that.
My experience is that the judges in Ohio are rather circumspect in
addressing these issues because, quite frankly, they do not want to step
over the line.
Now, we do have some candidates saying some things this year they
did not say previously. For instance, a candidate stated that money and
politics do not mix. This candidate compared the sale of seats on the
New York Stock Exchange with buying a seat on the Ohio Supreme
Court. Our Conduct Committee addressed that issue.
We had a candidate recently quoted in a newspaper endorsing a
political candidate. The judicial candidate was at a political gathering
giving a lecture, and she told the audience that she had an occasion to
meet the incumbent President of the United States. When she met the
incumbent President, she told him that her son was so proud that the
incumbent was his Commander-in-Chief. The candidate then told the
audience, "I hope all of you get out and make sure we still have the
Commander in Chief that we need."
Now, my understanding is that judicial candidates are not supposed
to endorse non-judicial candidates. I think that is in the Code of
Judicial Conduct in most states. This is the closest thing to an
endorsement I have ever heard from a judicial candidate. I do not know
whether a complaint has been filed, but it raises the question whether
it was a violation of White. It is a violation of the Code of Conduct. But
I think it is really difficult to find very concrete examples in Ohio of a
candidate who explicitly violates the tenets of the decision in White.
There are also those who believe in Ohio, and I think elsewhere, that
it is not too far in the future that White will probably be extended, and
judges will be able to say almost anything they wish. I am considered
a political junkie, and I have been around judges for a long time and
other candidates as well. I still believe that most judges will not cross
the line. I find that today, and I think it speaks highly of our judiciary
in general, that they are not going to cross that line.
The problem is very critical. Judges are sensitive to the studies you
heard cited earlier today regarding the influence of money and the
influence of friendships. So I think, for what it's worth, that we
sometimes read a little too much into White and worry too much about
it. Therefore, the influence of money is the most serious problem facing
the judiciary in this country, not the decision in White.
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MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Mike, what is the response in New York?
MR. SWEENEY- Those of you who were at the dinner last night will
remember that when Justice Phillips was asked what he considers the
best judicial selection system, he suggested that you appoint trial level
judges and that you elect the appellate judges. New York does exactly
the opposite. In New York, we appoint or designate our appellate judges
and we elect our justices to the trial court of general jurisdiction, known
as the Supreme Court.
The particular mix of selection processes creates different problems in
New York than in other jurisdictions like Ohio. We do not see the types
of money that is going into supreme court elections in other states. It
is New York's trial bench that is subject to election. Although trial court
judges exercise discretion, they do not have the final say on what the
law is.
New York did not have to respond directly to the White decision
because New York's Code of Judicial Conduct does not have an announce
clause. Of course, there has been much speculation on what the decision
in White means for any speech restrictions on judicial candidates, and
I think that has been of some concern in New York. There have been
several responses in New York.
One of the responses by the judiciary was that the Chief Judge of the
State of New York appointed a commission, the Commission to Promote
Public Confidence in Judicial Elections ("the Commission"), for which I
act as Legal Counsel. One of the things that she asked us to do was to
look at the rules governing campaign activity, which we did. Between
when the chief judge announced the Commission and when it was
appointed, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
decided Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,3
which was discussed this morning. The decision in Spargo challenged
not speech restrictions but the political activity restrictions in New
York's CJC. Further, the Second Circuit seemed to have a different view
of the constitutionality of the restrictions than the Eleventh Circuit did
in Weaver v. Bonner.4 When Spargo went to the Second Circuit, there
were two issues: the constitutionality of the CJC provisions and a
Younger v. Harris5 abstention issue. The first question the panel asked
was if it did not think that the challenge to the CJC had any merit, did
it need to abstain? In the end, the lower court decision was vacated, and

3. 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
4. 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
5. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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the case was remanded back to the state process. But there did not
seem to be a desire, on the part of at least that panel, to extend White.
In our December 2003 report,6 the Commission made recommendations to the chief judge with respect to the rules governing judicial
campaign activity. One of the recommendations was to incorporate the
commentary of the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct into New
York's CJC with some modifications. Right now, New York's CJC is
comprised of rules without commentary. We also recommended that the
CJC rules be revised to make clear that the speech restrictions were
limited to pledges and promises and commitments, and applied to both
candidates for judicial office and sitting judges. We also suggested some
revisions and additions to the rules for recusal based on campaign
activity, relating to both speech and money.
There has also been a response to White from the New York Court of
Appeals. In two post-White cases, In re Watson 7 and In re Raab,' the
New York Court of Appeals issued strong opinions supporting the New
York CJC's restrictions on political activity and speech. It determined
that they served an important state interest and that they clearly passed
constitutional muster.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: In Georgia, the response to Weaver and
White has been much hand wringing, breast beating, and fear, and that
led to the creation of the Court Futures Committee chaired by Judge
Studdard. The Committee is looking at many varied responses to the
situation posed by these cases. Should we have retention elections
instead of contested elections? Should we have longer term limits
instead of regular elections? Should there be recusal rules? Seth, what
is the conversation around the country echoing what is happening in
Georgia?
MR. ANDERSEN: There is a great deal of concern among members
of the bar and certainly among members of the judiciary about where all
of this will lead. Bill can talk a little bit more about what is happening
in Ohio and New York. The state bars in both of those states work with
local bars to form volunteer judicial campaign conduct committees under
the theory of matching speech with more speech.

6. The New York State Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections,
Interim Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York (Dec. 3, 2003), available at
http://law.fordham.edu/commission/judicialelections.
7. 100 N.Y.2d 290 (N.Y. 2003).
8. 100 N.Y.2d 305 (N.Y. 2003).
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MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Are restrictions or new rules on recusal an
effective way to deal with White?
MR. ANDERSEN: That has also been talked about a fair amount, and
I think that the commission that is revising the ABA Model Code is
looking at that as a possibility. It certainly makes sense in response to
White to say, well, if you are allowing judges to speak much more openly,
and if they are getting ever closer to that line of committing or
appearing to commit or pledging, or in fact crossing that line, that one
of the last defenses that the system has is strengthening the recusal
provisions.
I think some people also express concern that recusal is a back-end
solution. There are also some concerns that if the discretion still lies
ultimately with that individual judge on whether or not to recuse him
or herself from a case, how effective will that be in practice? Will we
end up with a system where any judge who says anything that could be
perceived to be a pledge or a promise or a commitment is going to be
challenged by one or both counsel on almost every conceivable issue by
saying, "Well, I have a copy of your speech from your campaign four
years ago where you said this. You're disqualified. You can't be
impartial on this." So while recusal may be necessary as a last defense
to maintain some semblance of impartiality or the appearance of it, in
particular cases, there are valid concerns about the utility of it.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM:
committees in Ohio?

Bill, do you have campaign conduct

MR. WEISENBERG: We have a Judicial Advertising Monitoring
Committee, which was created in April 2002 at the request of our chief
justice who came to me and the president of the state bar and said, "I
think it would be a good idea if you instituted a conduct committee for
the election in November." We created a committee. It was created by
the state bar. It is comprised of eleven persons, eight of whom are
lawyers and three are non-lawyers, including the president of the
League of Women Voters of Ohio. The committee today is comprised of
four Republicans, five Democrats, two Independents, a former president
of the Senate, who is a lawyer, a former minority leader of the Senate,
also a lawyer, a former judge who is retired now in Cincinnati, and
recently I recommended my mentor, who was chair of the judiciary
committee when I was working in the House of Representatives back in
the 1970s.
It is a remarkable committee. In 2002 when the committee first was
organized, it publicly condemned five advertisements run by independent
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campaign committees, held press conferences, and received very strong
support of its action from the media. We make it a habit in Ohio for the
State Bar President, myself, and my director of media relations to meet
with the chief editorial writers of every major newspaper in the state
and to meet with media representatives from the electronic media at
least once a year, and sometimes twice.
It was said this morning by Dean Elliott, "It's the power of persuasion." That is what it really is: how you sway people. You need a
voluntary committee that has a very simple standard. Does the
statement impugn the integrity of the court, impugn the integrity of a
candidate, or has the advertisement been structured in such a way as to
lead people to believe or lead the voter to believe, that the message is
designed to tell how the candidate would vote on a particular matter?
That is how the independent committee works.
By having the media as your friend and your ally, they will report and
they will cover your press conference. They will take your press releases
and publish them. When we went around earlier this year, one of the
first things that the editors of the paper said was, "Is the committee still
in place? Will we hear from the committee this year?," encouraging us
to do so. So when people say, "Does the committee do anything; is it
constructive?," the answer is "Yes." The last thing the candidate wants
to hear is that somebody is condemning an ad that somehow impacts
them.
Some of these ads are atrocious. First, most of them are lies. By
putting a poodle in a microwave oven and saying this is how frivolous
lawsuits happen perpetuates so-called urban legends. An independent
campaign committee ran an ad like that in 2002 and the ad further said,
"We will sue for you." It was designed to appeal solely to the emotions
of people.
Conduct committees can work. The one thing our conduct committee
does not do, and that may be as important as what it does do, if it is an
alleged violation of the elections law, we have an elections commission.
As a voluntary committee, we do not substitute our judgment for what
is a violation of the election laws.
One of the members of our commission was an Independent and a
former member of the Ohio Elections Commission, and it was his
recommendation to stay out of determining violations of election law.
That is not your bailiwick. If it is an alleged violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, there is a special committee of the court to deal with
that. By defining very carefully and very narrowly what your role is as
a conduct committee, you really gain much credibility and you can avoid
being considered political, because election law violations are political
issues. That is the reality. Leave it to the others to do it.
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Our committee, as I said, has only met once this year, and it was over
the statement about buying seats on the Exchange. We have not had
another complaint filed.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Does your committee have a voluntary
pledge like the one discussed in Georgia?
MR. WEISENBERG: We have a pledge that basically says, "I will
comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct, and I will not impugn the
integrity of the court, a candidate, or engage in conduct that would lead
a voter to believe that a candidate is predisposed to vote a certain way."
We had seven candidates this year, and we had four seats up, one
uncontested. Five of the seven candidates signed the pledge. When we
held the press conference to say how important it was, all five of those
candidates were standing there with the chair of our committee in front
of the cameras saying "I'm going to be good."
MR. KJRSCHENBAUM: What have the candidates been doing in
response to questionnaires in Ohio?
MR. WEISENBERG: I have not seen a questionnaire in Ohio. We do
not have the Christian Coalition or other religious groups being very
active in Ohio judicial races. The candidates mostly probably do not
respond to them. Those issues are not the issues in Ohio.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: What is the situation with these campaign
conduct committees in New York?
MR. SWEENEY New York has an enforcement structure for judicial
campaign activity issues. At the top of that structure is the Commission
on Judicial Conduct. It is an enforcement authority established by the
New York State Constitution, charged with enforcing the rules ofjudicial
conduct in New York, including the rules governing campaign activity.
The Commission is a state actor, and as such, it is required to provide
due process before imposing discipline. The requirement of due process
frustrates the ability to act quickly in the heat of a campaign. What can
and has happened is that a candidate risks later discipline in order to
win the election, believing that suffering a slap on the wrist as judge is
preferable to not being a judge.
The New York State Bar Association has encouraged local bar
associations to establish campaign oversight committees as private
actors. The committees are charged with mediating any disputes
between candidates. They do solicit pledges from candidates, but they
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can mediate even where a pledge has not been given. They also have
the ability to comment publicly. The theory is that, as private actors,
they can exercise the constitutionally preferred method of addressing
campaign conduct infractions-more speech. If a judicial candidate
violates the CJC, the campaign oversight committees, as private actors,
can publicly condemn the action.
The Commission to Promote Public Confidence heard a call from
several sources for some mechanism that would allow a more official
enforcement in the heat of the battle; a quick response, if you will. One
of our recommendations in our June 2004 Report to the Chief Judge 9
was to establish a state body with the ability to investigate campaign
conduct quickly and expedite legitimate complaints to the proper
authority.
The Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections
also dealt with campaign activity through education. One of the
concerns is that judicial candidates sometimes do not know what they
can and cannot say. New York is unique in that more than half our
judges are not lawyers. We have about 2,000 town and village justices
and there is no requirement that they are lawyers, and about 85 percent
of them are not. Many of the lay candidates do not have the same
training or the same understanding of the legal system that a lawyer
should have. So the Commission called for the establishment of the
Conduct in Ethics Center within the judicial branch. The Center is
charged with reaching out to every candidate for judicial office and
providing them with the information they need to run an election within
the rules of judicial conduct. The information would be disseminated by
CD, speakers, courses, etc. The Commission also recommended that
judicial candidates be required to take a course on judicial campaign
The course would be available online, by CD, and live.
ethics.
Completing the course would be a requirement for running for judicial
office.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Is that course available to other people
around the country if they wanted to use that model?
MR. SWEENEY I believe so. The idea is that much of the
tion would be available online. Of course, the material would
on the New York CJC. We presented this recommendation to
judge in December 2003, so it has not been fully implemented

informabe based
the chief
yet. But

9. Commission to Promote Public Confidence, Report to the Chief Judge of the State
of New York (June 29, 2004), available at http://law.fordham.edu/commission/judicialelec
tions.
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the Center has been established within the Office of Court Administration.
The other charge of the Center is to be an information source for the
public and the media. If the public or the media has a question about
certain activity-for example, Judge Jones is running for office and she
said this-they can go to the Center and ask if the activity is appropriate under the CJC. We hoped that would give the public and media the
ability to distinguish what is proper and improper campaign activity.
We hope that all these things working together will address the
problem. But, again, in New York we do not have the same problems
that Ohio does. We do not have as much television advertising because
the elected benches are for courts of general jurisdiction, and they are
local rather than statewide elections.
MR. WEISENBERG: We have a requirement that all judicial
candidates take a course on the Code of Conduct that includes all the
campaign rules. They all have to go take the course. The Constitution
in Ohio gives the Supreme Court of Ohio explicit authority over the
regulation of the courts and the practice of law. So, by rule they can
require this. They do not need to go to the legislature. In essence, it
would be a violation of the Code that every lawyer and judge is subject
to. Those courses work rather well. I have gone to them. They run
them several times during the election year. All the candidates for
judicial office go to them, and they are very well done.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: I am going to change gears now and talk
about how judges are selected when elections are not involved. As
everybody knows, at least here in Georgia, and I think it is true around
the country, the vast majority of judges are appointed to their positions
because of some kind of interim vacancy. Certainly that is true in
Georgia. There are different procedures for appointments around the
country, and they pose problems and solutions to this issue. Starting
with Bill, how does Ohio fill vacancies?
MR. WEISENBERG: You are correct. In Ohio more than half the
judges make their way initially to the bench via appointment. Appointments in Ohio are within the exclusive authority of the governor. The
governor makes appointments to fill any vacancy caused by death,
resignation, or removal from office.
We do not have nominating commissions. In 1986 while visiting the
republican chairman in Hamilton County, Cincinnati, when I was
working on merit selection, I was trying to convince him how good a
merit plan would be. He said, "We do have a merit plan in Hamilton
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County." I said, "You do?" He said, "You're talking to him." So it is a
purely political system, and we have to be honest about it.
Bob Taft is our current governor. He was elected to his first term in
1998. At the suggestion of the Ohio State Bar Association, the governor
developed through his legal counsel, who is now an appellate judge, a
questionnaire for potential candidates for filling vacancies. We borrowed
the questionnaire from the American Judicature Society. The governor's
staff modified it, did a wonderful job, bounced it back and forth with us
for several months, and now every person who wishes to be appointed to
fill a vacancy at any level of the court, state supreme court, trial, and
appellate division, fills out that questionnaire and sends it to the
governor's office. The chief legal counsel reviews it and consults with
the local political party chair in the county where the vacancy exists. In
most cases, the governor's office then will contact the local bar association.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Are those questionnaires made available to
the bar associations?
MR. WEISENBERG: After they are filled out?
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Yes.
MR. WEISENBERG: I am not aware that they are available to us.
I think they are more internal in nature.
When the local bar association is contacted, it is normally at a point
where the governor is about to make the appointment and it is done for
purely a very good political purpose. No governor wants to be embarrassed by an appointment. By and large, the system works pretty well
because most of the people appointed do a very good job. They do a very
good job of screening today. But recognizing it is a political system and
having known many of the people who have been elevated to the
judgeships through it, they have been involved politically at the local
level. Most of them have pretty good experience when they come. If you
have a governor, and our governor is a lawyer by training, who is
sensitive to the needs of the judiciary and wishes to spend time studying
the appointment process, the system can work.
We have talked about executive orders, and we have talked about
nominating commissions or evaluation mechanisms. The governor was
of the opinion that this process that he developed during his first term
has worked rather well, and at this point in time sees no need in
changing it.
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MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: So we know that Ohio is mired in political
patronage when it comes to the selection of judges. How about New
York, Mike? You have a two-tiered system in New York, don't you?
MR. SWEENEY Two-tiered? We have almost as many judicial
selection systems as we have courts, and there is a story that the chief
administrative judge in New York was once asked how many courts we
have in New York and responded, "Eleven or thirteen according to how
you count."
New York has a very complex system of selecting judges. For
example, for the court of appeals, we employ an appointment process
through a constitutionally mandated nominating commission that itself
is appointed by different branches of government. The governor is
empowered to appointment from the list of candidates the nominating
commission reports but needs Senate consent. Judges to our intermediate appellate court, the appellate division of the supreme court, are
designated by the governor, but only from the pool of elected supreme
court justices. Supreme court justices are elected, but not through a
primary system. Instead, New York uses a judicial district convention
system to nominate candidates for the general elections. Judges of the
family courts are elected, unless they serve in the family court of New
York City. That bench is appointed by the mayor of New York City.
County courts, which exist only outside of New York City, -have an
elected bench. New York City has civil courts with elected judges and
criminal courts with judges appointed by the mayor. Judges of the
courts of claims are appointed by the governor.
It is extraordinary how many different ways you can get to the bench
in New York. I have only listed some of them. In addition, judges from
lower courts, elected or appointed, can be administratively advanced to
the supreme court and become acting supreme court judges without
having been elected to that bench.
When there is a vacancy in an elected bench, the governor has the
ability to appoint someone to fill that vacancy until the next regularly
scheduled election. Governors have, at least since Mario Cuomo,
established by executive order screening commissions for candidates for
appointment. Candidates are required to go through a screening
commission before they are eligible for the governor's appointment. The
screening commissions are not limited to only recommending a certain
number of people. The idea behind them is that they really only screen
the dogs out. For instance, if someone with political clout asks the
governor to appoint someone unqualified, the governor can defer to the
screening commission. I do not know of a case where someone that the
governor wanted to appoint did not make it out of his screening
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commission. The same cannot be said for the nominating commission for
the court of appeals. But with the screening commissions that are
established by executive order, I am not aware of such a situation.
There is a similar process in the City of New York for mayoral
appointments. The screening commissions are not constituted in the
same way, but the process is similar. I believe it was established by
Mayor Koch by executive order, and every mayor has continued the
The mayoral
institution, with the exception of Mayor Giuliani.
commissions have operated well.
The appointments by the governor and mayor as a rule are qualified,
able jurists and public servants. What suffers, however, is diversity. I
use the term diversity in a broad sense, encompassing not only race,
ethnicity, and gender, but political, professional, and geographic
diversity as well. Under the current system in New York, we have not
seen diversity in gubernatorial appointments. For instance, someone
showed me numbers last year indicating that of the eighty-six or eightyseven interim appointments by the governor, eighty-five were Republican. That certainly does not reflect the diversity of the state. Although
the lower courts in some parts of New York enjoy diversity in a racial
and ethnic sense, the appellate division does not.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Well, Seth, what is happening around the
country? Can you give us an overview of how it breaks down throughout
the country for interim appointments?
MR. ANDERSEN: The nationwide average of those states that elect
their judges is that about 50 percent initially reach the bench through
an interim appointment. It varies tremendously. In some states, like
Minnesota, it is 90 percent. Only 10 percent of the time is there an
actual open contested seat when a vacancy is created. Whereas in other
states, due to tradition and the political culture, the number is much
lower and you see more electoral competition. Overall, about half of all
judges initially make it to the bench through an interim appointment.
Of the states that elect judges, nine of them have implemented some
kind of judicial nominating commission to assist in the process of filling
those vacancies. In some instances, like in New York state, here in
Georgia, and in several other states, that is accomplished by executive
order. That is the least durable system because each succeeding
governor coming in has the opportunity to revise that system or to not
implement a similar executive order.
A couple of states formed nominating commissions by statute, which
are more durable. Unless you overturn that statute, the system is there.
In a few states, they have actually amended their constitutions to create
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these nominating commissions for interim vacancies. So, you do still
have contestable judicial elections for people to earn a full term in office.
To impress upon you the tremendous variety of selection methods in
this country, there are several other selection methods that exist. In
Illinois and Louisiana, for instance, the governor does not make
appointments for interim vacancies; it is the supreme court. In some
instances in these states, there are screening bodies used. Generally
they consist of judges picking judges. Of course, in South Carolina and
Virginia the legislature selects all judges, and the voters have nothing
to do with it and neither does the governor.
The importance of this issue is really hard to overstate. There is a
myth in this country that we elect judges, and we do elect judges
sometimes. But the fact of the matter is that at least half of them get
to the bench through appointment. Once you are already appointed, you
have a built-in advantage. You are more likely to draw a challenger
that first time that you actually run for office. After that, if you win, the
chances of drawing a challenger in future elections diminish significantly, especially if you are in a rural area. It is not considered good form
to challenge a sitting judge in many places.
When you look at the percentage of judicial elections that are actually
truly contested-not just contested, but truly competitive, as is the case
with many other elected offices in this country-that is an even smaller
proportion. This is an important issue, and one of the questions that I
think folks around the country have to ask themselves is, "Given the
reality that many people initially reach the bench through an appointment, what is the best way to get there?"
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: In Georgia the system is that we have a
governor's judicial nominating committee that is a creature of the
governor. It is created by executive order. Every member of that
commission is appointed by the governor. Under the last governor, who
actually was a lawyer, the governor ignored his own commission in
appointing a judge to the Fulton County State Court. His suspicion was
that the appointment could not have even made it through his own
commission.
That experience led to a much heated and emotional conversation
among the members of the bar who were concerned with such things,
and the discussion about whether we should try to create an independent judicial nominating commission separate from the governor in
Georgia began. There is a subcommittee of the Court Futures Committee considering that creation.
What is happening around the country specifically with judicial
nominating committees? Is it a good idea, Seth? Why and what are the
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different ways of structuring these commissions? Then I will ask Bill
and Mike for their comments on this matter.
MR. ANDERSEN: I do think judicial nominating committees are a
good idea, and not just because the organization I work for, the
American Bar Association, and prior to that the American Judicature
Society, are both very strong supporters of so-called merit selection of
judges. We can talk for a long time about the utility of that term. But,
yes, I do think they are a good idea. Some studies done over the last
thirty or forty years have said there are some problems with these merit
selection systems. Some of the problems that have been cited include
Mike's discussion of New York, where no one knows of an instance when
the governor's favored candidate did not get through the commission.
There are ways to address that issue and reduce the amount of
tampering or influence that the appointing authority or anyone else can
have on the commission.
If you take as a basic supposition that you want to eliminate the least
qualified candidates as a basic starting point for any system of
appointing judges, and ideally you want to identify only the best
qualified, the systems in place around the country that involve a strong
and reasonably independent judicial nominating commission are the ones
that work best towards that goal of identifying only the best qualified
candidates. They spread the appointment authority out for commissioners so that it is not just the governor picking all of the candidates. The
governor gets a certain number of picks, minority and majority leaders
of both houses of the legislature get a certain number of picks, and the
bar association in many states, especially in the states that have a
mandatory bar, get a certain number of picks. Sometimes the chief
justice will get a pick. Some states go so far as to mandate that no more
than a simple majority of commissioners be a member of one political
party.
That is one way to grant some independence and autonomy to these
commissions. Another way is to have very clear procedures, very clear
rules about how this process works. For instance, the states that do it
best provide for a fixed number of nominees that are sent, or a range,
not a fixed number but a range of nominees, that are sent from the
commission to the governor. So instead of being open-ended, most states
either say three to five names shall go, or in some instances for appellate
seats, they say five to seven.
The states that work the best also require the governor to choose from
this list. The governor cannot reject the list. They might say the
governor can reject the list once and ask for a new list of nominees but
then must choose from that second list. On top of that, some states say
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that if the governor sits on this list and refuses to make an appointment,
under the theory that the name that he or she really wanted to see on
that list did not make it, after a fixed period of time, sixty or ninety
days, the governor forfeits the authority to make that appointment.
Under the law, that appointment is then made by the chief justice in
some places or even by the commission itself.
So I think if you have broadly-based, relatively independent commissions that have well thought-out and clear rules of procedure, as Chief
Justice Phillips said last night, that is probably the best system that has
been devised thus far for appointing judges. It does not really get to the
crux of election versus appointment, but in terms of appointment, is it
more desirable to have a broad-based commission than to allow one
single person, one actor, to have all of the discretion in the process? I
would argue that it is a better idea to have a commission.
MR. SWEENEY I would certainly not disagree with Seth, at least in
theory. I would like to add to something that Justice Phillips said last
night. He said that New York followed Mississippi, which it did, in
electing judges. He said that it was part of the Jacksonian Democracy
movement that swept the country. He was partly right. The move to an
elected bench in New York was also the result of rent riots that have
been described by historians as guerilla warfare. One of the main
reasons for the riots was a belief that the appointed judiciary represented the interests of the landowners exclusively. New York had an
agrarian economy at that time, and people were subject to onerous
tithing rules and were quickly evicted if they did not meet them. There
was a widespread perception among tenants that the judges were in the
pocket of the landowners. My point is that you can have a good
appointment system and you can have a bad one, just like you can have
a good election system and you can have a bad one.
The Commission's approach in New York was to try to combine the
two. Use the idea of screening candidates for qualification before they
reached the ballot. It incorporates the screening aspect of the Missouri
plan but leaves the selection of the judge to the people through popular
election. The idea comes from the ABA, which calls it merit election.
We recommended that the chief judge establish independent judicial
election qualification commissions ("IJEQC") on a judicial district basis.
Candidates for judicial office would be required to be screened by an
IJEQC. After the screening, candidates would then go through their
local political process.
The IJEQCs would be broad-based and
independent (if that is possible in any endeavor), and charged with
making sure that every candidate for judicial office in New York state
is qualified to serve the office. The idea is that if Justice Scalia and
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Justice Ginsberg went through the IJEQC process, they would both be
reported out as qualified. Voters and local processes would then decide
which one is more appropriate for their community. The IJEQC's role
is not to decide for the local community who is the better judge, it is
simply to ensure that both candidates are qualified.
We hope that the structure of the IJEQC encourages qualified people
to go through the screening process that might not otherwise apply.
Several aspects of the IJEQCs are designed with this in mind. We
charged the IJEQCs with encouraging qualified candidates to come
forward and be screened. The screening process, the criteria to be
applied, and the identity of the IJEQC members would be public
knowledge.
We also expect that the IJEQCs will encourage a broader pool of
candidates because every qualified candidate is reported out. In many
existing screening commissions, only a certain number of people are
reported out or the candidates are ranked. People told us that if you
come from a community not represented on the bench, or if you are not
politically connected, you will not participate in this process. The
perception is that you have nothing to gain. You will not make it into
the limited number of people reported out or you end up with a qualified
instead of a well-qualified rating. By providing that every qualified
candidate is reported out on equal footing, the IJEQCs make being
screened worthwhile for a qualified candidate. Even if the person does
not have a realistic chance of being elected, she has the distinction of
being found qualified along with the other candidates. We expect that
as people from different backgrounds are reported out as qualified,
political leaders would begin recognizing this pool of qualified candidates. That, we hope, will lead to a diverse bench. I understand that
the IJEQCs will be implemented by the end of this year for the 2005
elections.
MR. WEISENBERG: The Ohio State Bar Association for at least
seventy-five years has supported an appointive elective system. I want
to emphasize what I just said-appointive elective. I did not use the
term merit selection.
The term merit selection has turned many people off because, "What
is merit and who decides?" Because it is an appointive elective system,
which I believe A.P. Carlton is going to address, we have recognized that
maybe we have to think a little bit differently.
In Ohio we would advocate and support nominating commissions. We
also recognize that you cannot take politics out of politics, and whatever
system you have, there are elements of the political system that
influence it. It is reality.
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I think we would broaden the pool of candidates, widen the net so to
speak, by having nominating commissions, and people would think that
perhaps there is an opportunity that they did not have before. There is
some evidence that it does broaden the pool. In the 1980s, the Fund for
Moderate Courts in New York was showing that in appointive elective
states, minorities and women at that time had a much better opportunity to get appointments to ascend to the judiciary in states that had such
a system.
My own perspective on nominating commissions is that I would not
preclude the political parties from participating on those commissions.
I would rather have them at the table as part of the process than in the
back room where they are going to be anyway. I like people at the table.
I like to see their faces. I like them to participate. The broader the base
of the nominating commission, the more realistic we make it to make the
system work.
No governor that I am aware of is ever going to voluntarily give up
their appointment power. Governors come from a political process
through the party system, so the party system is an integral part of it.
If we recognize that nominating commissions can work, it will lend
greater credibility to the process. But you can have good appointive
systems, and you can have bad appointive systems. You can have good
elective systems and bad ones. What we really have to be thinking
about is thinking outside the box, that term we hear all so often, and try
some new ways of doing it.
Nominating commissions or evaluation commissions that are
They are being
recommended through the ABA are wonderful.
circulated to you, and I encourage you to read them. They are excellent
reports and will give you some great ideas. I am not aware of any
member of my board of governors or any officer of the Ohio State Bar
Association who would not want to see an experiment with nominating
commissions in Ohio.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: I want to close this session, and then I want
to open it up for some questions by telling kind of an anecdote. My
second wife had this saying that she thought that anybody could clean
up their act and seem rational and reasonable for fifteen minutes at a
cocktail party. You walk out of that party thinking, "Well, that was a
nice guy or she was pretty interesting. I liked her."
I was the chair of the Judicial Nominating Commission in Atlanta.
The system in Atlanta is that the Commission works through two courts,
one which is about to be abolished. There were two courts in Atlanta
that had judges appointed by the mayor. The Judicial Nominating
Commission, which consisted of three lawyers from the Atlanta Bar
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Association, three lawyers from the Gate City Bar, which is the AfricanAmerican Bar (although now there has been a proliferation of Bars and
it is kind of an antiquated system), and two citizen members appointed
by the mayor. It was a pretty non-political commission.
When there was a vacancy on these courts, we would advertise, and
we would get approximately thirty or forty people who wanted to be a
municipal court judge. We had detailed questionnaires filled out in
excruciating detail, and these questionnaires were made available to the
bar associations. The bar associations could appear before the Commission to put in their two cents worth on the qualifications of the
candidates.
Then the candidates would come before the Commission for the
interview. They would walk in, and they would look good, sound good,
and handle themselves quite nicely for fifteen minutes. By the way, the
courts both had Missouri plan retention systems, so once these judges
made it to the bench, they were in for life.
I want to also put in the caveat that I am in favor of judicial
nominating commissions, and I hope that one gets established here in
Georgia that is independent of the governor. But, unfortunately, the
experience we had was that many of these people looked good and
sounded good and made it through a reasonably legitimate merit
selection process. They fooled us, and they got up on the bench and they
turned into "robe-itis," black robe fever, horrible, condescending,
arrogant, mean, lazy disasters. There was no way to get rid of them
because they were running on the Missouri plan.
I have to echo what Mike is saying and agree that no system is
foolproof. No system is failsafe. That is one of the reasons why I
disagree with the chief justice's suggestion last night that you have
merit selection followed by the Missouri plan. I think one good thing
about elections is that there is a mechanism for getting rid of mistakes,
and other than that all you have is the JQC of Georgia. The only way
the JQC can get rid of a judge is if the judge does something completely
egregious or insane or criminal or something along those lines. Elections
do give some kind of a failsafe way to get rid of mistakes.
I am fairly new to Georgia, and my
AUDIENCE MEMBER:
understanding is that, for the last many, many years in Georgia, the
judges would resign a certain number of days before election day and
then be reappointed, and the only reason that this is now an issue is
because we have a Republican governor for the first time in 134 years.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: No, that is not exactly the issue. The history
in Georgia was that judges would retire or resign in the middle of their
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term so that the governor could appoint their successor, instead of
serving out their terms, in which case there would have to be a contested
election to fill that expired term.
When the current governor was elected, who is the first Republican
governor in the state of Georgia since Reconstruction, there was much
scuttlebutt around the state that Democratic judges who were going to
leave the bench would instead serve out their terms rather than resign
in the middle of their terms and give that Republican scallywag the
appointment power. That has not really happened despite AUDIENCE MEMBER: Except in DeKalb County.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: - except in DeKalb County, and one judge
in Fulton County served out a term. But it has not been some huge
groundswell. There have been a fair number of appointments. Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just want to comment on your statement
about how you can get bad judges through commissions, and you pointed
to the JQC as one reason that they are not funded enough. They may
not have enough resources or their jurisdiction over bad judges is
limited. There are a number of ways you can couple a merit selection,
with an apology to Seth, with an appointed selection plan with increased
judicial discipline. At the same time, you give the public confidence that
these judges will leave the bench.
It could be very simple, such as a call from the OCA, the head of the
OCA, or the officer of court administration, could call this judge and say,
"I have heard .... ." There is a proper tone at the top, and when the
chiefjudge of the state, or the head of the Office of Court Administration
calls this judge and asks him, "What is this I heard about what is going
on in your courtroom?," things may happen short of removal for insanity
or whatever other reasons you may have. Mike, if Jonathan Lippman,
who is the head of our OCA in New York, called in a judge and asked
him to explain his conduct, there might be consequences.
MR. SWEENEY Or you might get the complete opposite reaction,
depending on who the judge is. I do agree with you, however. We
recommended the establishment of retention elections so that a qualified
incumbent would have the benefit of retention elections. To ensure that
the incumbent is qualified, we recommended that a judge only be eligible
for a retention election if he or she passed the IJEQC. Retention
elections for qualified incumbents are a great way to avoid the money
raising, political influence, and campaigning of contested elections.
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MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Right. One of the problems that judges often
have is that they do not really receive honest feedback from people. If
you are in the courtroom and they are being arrogant, and they have
been arrogant for years, no one is telling them because who is going to
tell the judge? There is a little-used committee in the state of Georgia
that is designed for people to go to to complain about a judge anonymously and confidentially. Then the committee goes to the judge and
says, "Judge, we've been getting these reports about you." Sometimes
judges respond, "Really? I didn't know I was doing that," and do
conform their behavior.
Seth, regarding that information you
AUDIENCE MEMBER:
discussed about judges misbehaving on the bench, in an elective system
the voters may not be able to even get that information so as to act on
it. We saw today, for example, a voter's guide from North Carolina. I
do not know if these judges are the types of judges that you have
described: abusive, nasty, arrogant, fall of robe-itis, or not. A voter's
guide does not say a thing about their personalities. How do you get
that information to the voters and get the voters to care?
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Well, that voter's guide is really not a rating
guide. It looked like a resume guide to me.
MR. WEISENBERG: There is a draft of a report that is being
circulated by a committee of the American Bar Association right now
regarding different standards of review. I cannot remember the name
of the committee it came out of, but it was sent to the bar associations.
One of the things it speaks to is mid-term evaluation of judges, which
many states do. There are different forms of these evaluations. One is
done internally and confidentially by their colleagues and by the bar
association. In states that elect judges in particular, where they have
to stand for election, if judges do not measure up, that becomes known
to the public.
If bar associations are vigilant in their work and there are rules in
place within the state for evaluation of the judges, that can serve as a
mechanism for improvement. Most judges who go through the process
benefit from it. For those who are silly enough not to listen, at some
point in time they find a very good opponent. Incumbent judges have
suffered defeats in those situations, so there are mechanisms.
MR. ANDERSEN: Yes. I am actually helping to staff that effort to
update the ABA Guidelines on the Evaluation of Judicial Performance.
It is a system that is largely unknown in many states where it does exist

882

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

because many states do it internally. The judiciary has a program of
evaluation where attorneys and sometimes others, such as litigants,
jurors, witnesses, fellow judges, and court employees, are surveyed, but
the results will only go back to the judge, purely for self-improvement
purposes.
There is great value to it because when you are a judge, you do not
typically receive honest feedback on your performance. Everyone laughs
at your jokes and says, "Oh, what a great job." If you give people an
opportunity to respond anonymously, in an appropriate way, judges get
that very valuable feedback.
In addition, a number of states have programs now that perform these
evaluations in the middle of a judge's term, and they are purely
confidential, for self-improvement purposes. In the states that have an
appointment and retention system, they go back and conduct them again
before a judge is to stand for retention. Those results are released to the
voting public along with a recommendation on whether Judge X should
be retained or should not be retained.
Retention elections are still largely, 98.5 or 99 percent victories for
judges. It is exceedingly difficult, even in states that have these official
performance evaluations and with a commission that says this judge did
not measure up to the standards, to get that message out and get those
kind of judges off the bench in a retention election. But there are
systems that can be improved upon and that are being expanded around
the country. Certainly anyone who is interested in those systems should
let me know. We still have these guidelines out for comments.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You said that what concerned you most about
an election was the financial concern. Has the state of Ohio been taking
action against some groups and some contributors? That's what I
understood you to say.
MR. WEISENBERG: There are two parts to your question. First, in
Ohio the biggest concern we have is money. In 2002 there was more
money spent in Ohio on our supreme court elections than the rest of the
supreme court elections in the United States combined. When you take
what the candidates raised and what the independent committees raised,
we estimate it was somewhere around $12 million for two seats.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Where was that money coming from?
MR. WEISENBERG: It comes from independent committees. You
have it on two sides. On one side, you have the business community,
such as Informed Citizens for Ohio and Citizens for a Strong Ohio. On
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the other side, you have the line-up of the plaintiff's bar and labor.
That's how it comes out. And it's our side and their side.
There is another publication that was not mentioned today that I
would like to suggest. The Brennan Center puts out remarkable
publications. One is called The New Politics of JudicialElections 2002.
I encourage you to contact the Brennan Center in New York."° This
document is one of the most fascinating documents. I had a copy of it
given to every member of the Ohio General Assembly because I wanted
them to see the influence that money had, and it is all about money in
Ohio.
In Ohio there are ninety-nine House members and thirty-three
Senators. Approximately twenty years ago, a labor leader told me that
it was much easier to count to four than to fifty or seventeen. That is
true not just in Ohio, but in other states where elections occur as well.
It is much easier to influence the outcome of a single seat or two seats
on a court than it is to influence the outcome of many elections in a
legislative body. When people look at a court today, the issues of tort
reform, medical malpractice, and workers' compensation insurance are
about money. When people start talking about "our seat on the court,"
or "We don't want to lose control of our seat on the court," that is what
you hear. That is what we hear in Ohio.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Following up on the issue of interim
appointments and people resigning somehow so an ally to the governor's
office can be appointed, there has been research actually in the federal
system to show that these regignations have been going on for hundreds
of years. It is not a surprise at all that federal district courts and
federal courts of appeals judges who have lifetime appointments will
specifically resign when they have an ally in the White House so a
successor can be appointed. Of course you have seen this in the
Supreme Court as well. Chief Justice Warren tried to do this with his
successor apointment, although it did not work. But then Chief Justice
Burger did resign when he had an ally in the White House. That this
is happening in states is just a reflection of what has been happening for
a long time. When there is an uproar against it, it is often the gut
reaction people have that, "Oh, politics is not supposed to enter into the
system." It is supposed to be different. You cannot completely divorce
politics from the system, and I think these judges are simply being
rational and smart.

10. You can contact the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of
Law at 161 Avenue of the Americas, 12th Floor, New York, NY 10013, or visit their web
site at http://www.brennancenter.org.
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MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: You can tinker. You try to change the
equation, tamp down the political, and tamp up the merit. You try to do
that.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But it is better to acknowledge that it exists
as opposed to burying your head in the sand.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike, could you elaborate on what you said
about a screening commission focusing on minimal qualifications,
particularly in light of Seth's anecdote about the candidates who can
look good for fifteen minutes?
MR. SWEENEY Yes. I will not go into the recommendation in depth
because it is in the report. Although the report looks imposing, the body
is only about fifty pages. The rest of the report largely presents the
research behind our recommendations.
For instance, the Marist
Institute for Public Policy conducted a poll of registered voters and a
survey of sitting judges in New York. The results are in the report.
We heard from many people and groups, including bar associations
that screen in many different ways. Our idea was to put together a
screening commission appointed by the bar and three branches of
government, and provide it with the resources to do a thorough
investigation of judicial candidates. You can never be sure that you got
it exactly right. For instance, Justice Souter was appointed by a
conservative Republican. You just do not know in every case. But
nothing is perfect, and we have to make the effort. The IJEQCs that we
recommended tried to develop the expertise of local bar associations and
other organizations around the state, and indeed around the country, to
come up with the best model for New York.
MR. KIRSCHENBAUM: Mike, Seth, Bill, thank you. Our time is up.

(SESSION CONCLUDED)

